題目：Price-compatible matching mechanisms for carrier collaboration
主講人：徐素秀 教授（暨南大學）
時間：2017年5月25日15:00點
地點：主樓216室
主講人介紹：
徐素秀，博士，暨南大學教授、博導，美國INFORMS會員，美國IISE會員。2008年畢業于哈爾濱工業大學數學系（哈爾濱），獲理學學士學位；2011年畢業于哈爾濱工業大學深圳研究生院，獲管理學碩士學位；2014年畢業于香港大學工業及制造系統工程系，獲哲學博士學位。徐博士曾擔任香港大學工業及制造系統工程系博士后兼榮譽助理教授（Honorary Assistant Professor），“運籌學”和“金融工程”本科課程講師。研究方向主要包括：智能物流服務網絡優化、拍賣與機制設計、及運營管理。徐博士聯合主持及參與了一系列國家及跨國企業項目，包括：香港RGC GRF項目、P&G SNIC 項目、國家自然科學基金面上項目、及國家自然科學基金青年基金；以第一作者或通訊作者在相關領域發表了11篇A+ / A類國際期刊論文，其中8篇發表在物流運輸及運營管理領域A+類國際期刊，如 Production and Operations Management, Transportation Science, Transportation Research Part B, IIE Transactions。自2013年起，論文總被引近150次。
徐教授擔任了多個A+ / A類國際期刊的特約審稿人，包括Operations Research、Transportation Research Part B、Transportation Science、Transportation Research Part E、IIE Transactions、Production and Operations Management、International Journal of Production Economics、European Journal of Operational Research、Decision Support Systems等。徐博士擔任了國際期刊Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing的特刊編輯，同時還是多個國際會議的大會秘書和分會場主席，包括2015 INFORMS Annual Meeting（分會場主席），The 5th Institute of Industrial Systems Engineers Asian Conference（IISEAsia2016，大會秘書），The 5th POMS-HK International Conference （POMS-HK2014，大會秘書）。
內容介紹：
This study is the first extending the existing market design theory to the field of supply chain and logistics management. It is known that money flow is not allowed in the matching markets like stable marriage, house allocation, and kidney exchange. In this study, we explore the potential of lane exchange among a number of self-interested truckload carriers in a collaboration network (i.e., carrier collaboration ). We consider two cases of money flow in carrier collaboration: (i) a carrier who fails to exchange his lane may join the procurement mechanism as a transportation service purchaser; and (ii) a carrier who fails in lane exchange can always transfer his lane to the platform by making a fixed payment.We propose the (price-compatible) top trading cycles and deals (TTCD) mechanism for case (i) and the price-compatible top trading cycles andchains (PC-TTCC) mechanism for case (ii). Both mechanisms are effective in terms of the compatibility with money flow, strategy-proofness, the realized welfare of carriers, and budget balance. Our experiment simulations show that the PC-TTCC mechanism results in “amazing” cost saving for the collaboration network and (ex post) budget balance for the platform. Especially in the clustered network, our mechanisms can achieve cost saving of 17% for the network, and make 84% of carriers strictly better off. There is no collaboration in the benchmark case. Experimental results also provide some important practical and managerial implications of designing and operating the collaboration network. Overall, this study opens the door to the solutions of a host of price-compatible matching problems.
（承辦：管理科學與工程系，科研與學術交流中心）
