題 目：Study on the Group-buying auction
主講人：陳劍教授 清華大學經濟偉德國際1946bv官網
時 間：2011年12月23日(周五) 下午15：30
地 點：主樓241會議室
主講人簡介:
清華大學經濟偉德國際1946bv官網管理科學與工程系聯想講席教授（Lenovo Chair Professor）、博士生導師，清華大學經濟偉德國際1946bv官網管理科學與工程系系主任, 教育部人文社會科學重點研究基地——清華大學現代管理研究中心主任。于1983年獲得清華大學電機系學士學位，1986年獲得清華大學自動化系碩士學位，1989年獲得清華經濟偉德國際1946bv官網博士學位。主要研究領域為供應鏈管理、電子商務、商務智能與決策分析、系統優化與預測技術等。講授課程包括動態系統分析與控制、決策理論、運作管理、供應鏈管理等。
陳劍教授作為作者/合作者在《Annals of Operations Research》，《IEEE Transaction on System, man and Cybernetics—Part A: systems and human》，《IIE Transactions》，《Information Science》，《International Journal of Production Economics》，《Naval Research Logistics》，《Operations Research Letters》，《Production and Operations Management》，《系統工程理論與實踐》、《管理科學學報》等國際國內學術期刊上發表論文一百七十多篇；主持近二十個國家自然科學基金委、教育部、863等國家部委項目，以及近20個地方政府/企業委托項目。應邀在多個國際會議上做大會報告（Keynote/Plenary Lecture）。陳劍教授獲得過多項科技獎勵及榮譽稱號，如教育部科技進步獎/自然科學獎/人文社會科學獎；國際電氣和電子工程師協會（IEEE）會士；IBM學院獎；教育部長江學者；復旦管理學獎；全國優秀博士學位論文指導教師；北京市政府科學技術進步獎；中國青年科技獎等。
陳劍教授在多個學術組織中任職，如擔任生產和運營管理學會（POMS）副理事長（負責亞太區），IEEE系統、人與控制論學會服務系統和組織專業委員會主席，IEEE SMC北京分會主席，中國系統工程學會副理事長，中國優選法統籌法與經濟數學研究會副理事長，中國信息協會常務理事，國家自然科學基金會管理科學部專家委員會委員、工商管理組副組長等，也是眾多國際會議的主席/共同主席，同時擔任多個國際學術雜志（如：Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering、Electronic Commerce Research and Applications、IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics、Flexible Services and Manufacturing、International Journal of Information Technology and Decision Making、 Systems Research and Behavioral Science等）的編輯或編委。
內容簡介：
With the development of electronic commerce, online auction plays an important role in the electronic market. The group-buying auction (GBA) is a new kind of dynamic pricing mechanism on the Internet. It makes the bidders as a group through Internet to get the volume discounts, i.e., the more bidders bid, the lower the price of the object being auctioned becomes. In this talk, we first analyze the group-buying auction under some assumptions and build an incomplete information dynamic game model to illustrate the bidders’ bidding process. It proves that for the bidders there exists a weakly dominant strategy S, i.e., no matter when a bidder arrives at the auction and what the bidding history is, the highest permitted bid price that is no greater than his value to the object is always his optimal bid price, but may not be the unique one. Then, we analyze the seller's pricing strategy with the GBA. Based on the bidders' optimal strategy, the sellers' optimal price curve of the GBA in the uniform unit cost case and in some supply chain coordination contracts are explored. We find that the best discount rate is zero, which implies the optimal GBA is equivalent to the optimal fixed pricing mechanism (FPM). Furthermore, we compare the GBA with the FPM in two special cases, the economies of scale and risk-seeking seller, and find that in both cases the GBA outperforms the FPM. The collusion of bidders in traditional auctions is generally forbidden because it is harmful to the interests of sellers. However, we find that collusion in the GBA results in higher bidding, leading to market expansion that benefits both bidders and sellers. Finally, we extend our study to B2B commerce, i.e., consider a supply chain with one supplier and several retailers in their respective independent market, where the supplier offers a new pricing mechanism based on the GBA. An equilibrium is presented.
