題 目： Institutions and Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier Exchanges: The Moderated Mediating Effects of Contractual and Relational Governance
主講人：盛仕斌 教授 （美國(guó)伯明翰阿拉巴馬大學(xué)）
時(shí) 間：6月4日下午3點(diǎn)
地 點(diǎn)：主樓426
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
Dr. Shibin Sheng is Professor of Marketing at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Dr. Sheng received a Ph.D. in Marketing from Virginia Tech and BS in Mechanical Engineering from Tsinghua University, China. Dr. Sheng’s research interests include pricing, market channels, marketing strategy in emerging markets, and institutional theory. He has published numerous papers in leading marketing journals such as Journal of Marketing, Journal of Operations Management, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, International Journal of Research in Marketing, Industrial Marketing Management, Journal of Business Research, Marketing Letters, and others. He has presented his work at numerous international conferences. Dr. Sheng is currently serving in the editorial board of several international marketing journals. Dr. Sheng is currently a visiting professor at Beijing Institute of Technology.
內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：
The marketing channel literature has paid limited attention to institutional environments that constrain buyer–supplier exchanges, though such institutions are fundamental determinants of transaction costs, and thus of the occurrence of opportunism in the buyer–supplier dyads. Drawing on transaction cost economics and institutional theory, this study uncovers the critical influence of formal and informal institutions (i.e., legal effectiveness and networking expenditure) on the use of governance in deterring opportunism, as well as the moderating role of government support on the efficacy of governance mechanism. The findings from a buyer–supplier dyadic survey and two secondary datasets reveal that legal effectiveness mitigates opportunism through increased use of both contractual and relational governance; in contrast, networking expenditure reduces opportunism through relational governance, yet increases opportunism via lowering contractual governance. In addition, contractual governance is more efficient in constraining opportunism when government support is high, whereas relational governance deters opportunism more when government support is low. These findings offer important implications for academic research and managerial practice.
