題目：Hayek, Local Information and the Decentralization of State-Owned Enterprises in China
主講人：馬光榮 副教授（中國人民大學(xué)財政金融學(xué)院）
時間：2017年3月29日下午14:30
地點：主樓418
主講人介紹：
馬光榮現(xiàn)任中國人民大學(xué)財政金融學(xué)院副教授。他2008年獲得東南大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)學(xué)士學(xué)位，2013年獲得北京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位。研究領(lǐng)域主要包括財政學(xué)和發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等，其在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的國內(nèi)外頂級期刊《American Economic Review》,《Journal of Comparative Economics》《中國社會科學(xué)》、《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》、《管理世界》、《世界經(jīng)濟(jì)》等中英文期刊上發(fā)表多篇文章，曾榮獲洪銀興經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎、鄧子基財經(jīng)學(xué)術(shù)論文獎等。這次匯報的研究為其即將發(fā)表在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)最權(quán)威的五大期刊之一的《American Economic Review》上的研究成果。
內(nèi)容介紹：
Hayek (1945) argues that local knowledge is a key for understanding whether production should be decentralized. We test Hayek’s predictions by examining the causes of the Chinese government’s decision to decentralize state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Since the government located closer to an SOE has more information over that enterprise, a greater distance between the government and the enterprise should lead to a higher likelihood of decentralization. Moreover, where communication costs and the government’s uncertainty over an enterprise’s performance are greater, the government is more likely to decentralize enterprises to better utilize local information. We find empirical support for these implications.
（承辦：應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟(jì)系，科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
